We cryptanalyze Fridrich's chaotic image encryption algorithm. We show that the algebraic weaknesses of the algorithm make it vulnerable against chosen-ciphertext attacks. We propose an attack that reveals the secret permutation that is used to shuffle the pixels of a round input. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our attack with examples and simulation results. We also show that our proposed attack can be generalized to other well-known chaotic image encryption algorithms.
Introduction
In the last three decades, there has been a growing research effort to apply chaos to cryptography [Amigo et al., 2007] . The noise-like statistical properties of chaotic signals and the sensitivity of chaotic systems naturally relate them to confusion and diffusion properties of encryption algorithms [Menezes et al., 1996; Dachselt & Schwarz, 2001] .
Despite the apparent affinity between the concepts of chaos and cryptography, using chaos within an encryption algorithm is far from trivial. In fact, many chaotic ciphers fall short of satisfying even the most basic security requirements [Alvarez & Li, 2006; Kelber & Schwarz, 2007; Masuda et al., 2006] .
Early attempts at using chaos in cryptography included synchronization-based methods where synchronized chaotic signals are used to modulate and demodulate message signals [Yang et al., 1997] . While such an approach provides a spread spectrum communication setup, the analog nature of the systems makes approximation-based attacks possible [Parker & Short, 2001; Yang et al., 1998 ].
Identification methods can also be used to reveal secret system parameters [Liu et al., 2004] .
Another approach is the discretization of chaotic signals at some stage in the system and using the resulting sequence to modify plaintext, possibly in multiple rounds [Masuda & Aihara, 2002a; Ozoguz et al., 2006] . Some of these schemes use chaotic systems to generate a pseudorandom sequence which is then simply XORed with the plaintext. Other proposals use iterated lowdimensional chaotic systems to implement complex nonlinear functions that are similar to S-boxes used in classical block ciphers [Szczepanski et al., 2005] . Still others use chaos to implement permutations of plaintext blocks [Fridrich, 1998; Masuda & Aihara, 2002b; Xiang et al., 2006] .
A particular area of interest within chaos cryptography is image encryption. Naturally, a fast and strong image encryption has the potential for application in diverse areas of multimedia applications. By treating the image as a sequence of bits, classical block ciphers like DES and AES can be used with an appropriate mode of operation.
Still, the desire to obtain faster ciphers motivate researchers to seek new ways to incorporate chaos in image encryption [Pisarchik et al., 2006; Arroyo et al., 2008; Mao et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2004] .
The rich variety of chaotic ciphers provides a motivation for cryptanalysts to find statistical or structural weaknesses in these proposals . As a result of this dual effort to design and break chaotic ciphers, one might expect to see the emergence of robust applications of chaos in strong cryptography. While many chaotic ciphers have been shown to have weaknesses, new modifications are being proposed to implement defenses to resist the discovered attacks.
In this paper, we cryptanalize Fridrich's cipher which is one of the earliest chaotic image encryption algorithms [Fridrich, 1998] . We show that the algorithm can be broken using a chosen-ciphertext attack. We show that the attack reveals secret permutation of the algorithm. Although more than a decade has passed since its publication in 1998, to our knowledge, the present work is the first successful cryptanalysis of Fridrich's cipher.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a mathematical description of Fridrich's image encryption algorithm. Section 3 gives a detailed description of our attack. Section 4 presents an illustrative example and simulation results for realistic image sizes. The paper finishes with concluding remarks. In the conclusion, we also discuss application of our results to other similar encryption algorithms and possible defense mechanisms.
Description of the Encryption Algorithm
The plaintext P is an M × N grayscale image, where each pixel is represented using a byte. The image is first vectorized using the usual row-scan. Let p ∈ S n represent this vectorized image, where S = {0, 1, . . . , 255} and n = NM. Thus, the plaintext is the vector
Each round consists of two steps. In the first step, p is shuffled using a secret permutation. Let b denote this secret permutation defined on the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. Let us denote the shuffled vector by f . The relation between the shuffled vector f and the vectorized plaintext p can be expressed as
Namely, the shuffled pixel at position i is obtained from the original pixel at position b(i).
In the second step of the round, f is passed through a nonlinear function as
where g : S → S is a fixed nonlinear function and h ∈ S n is a fixed vector. In Eq. (2), c 0 is taken to be a fixed system parameter.
These two steps are repeated for R rounds. In [Fridrich, 1998] , R = 10 is suggested for good diffusion and confusion properties.
Combining Eqs. (1) and (2), we obtain one round encryption as
The decryption for a single round is defined as follows. Let u be the inverse of b, so that
Substituting Eq. (4) in Eq. (3), we obtain
For i = 1, we have
The secret component of the algorithm is the permutation b. A set of secret keys are used to generate this permutation. For example, in one of the schemes proposed in [Fridrich, 1998 ], the original image P is partitioned and the Baker map is applied to each partition to obtain the permutation. In this case, the set of keys are the boundaries where the image is partitioned. It is possible to use other schemes to generate a permutation. Our attack is general and applies to all of these cases.
Chosen Ciphertext Attack
A naive attack might try to reveal the keys that were used to generate the permutation b. However, anyone who knows permutation b can decrypt the images. In our cryptanalysis, we develop methods to reveal the permutation b. Such an approach is more general as it easily covers cases where different chaotic maps are used to generate the permutation.
Causality in decryption
The function g in Eq. (3) 
As a result, a ciphertext pixel depends on many plaintext pixels. This is a desirable property of an encryption and is also known as the diffusion property [Menezes et al., 1996] .
However, the situation is quite different in decryption. Using Eq. (5), we see that, for a single round, p j is affected by only two ciphertext pixels, c u(j) and c u(j)−1 . Similarly, for two rounds, p j is affected by at most four ciphertext pixels.
In order to see this more clearly, let us denote the output of the second round as (5) with c k as the plaintext pixel that is input to second round, we obtain
Here, we denote by u s , the s-times composition of u with itself.
Thus, we see from Eqs. (5), (7) and (8) that, for two rounds of decryption, p j is affected only by the ciphertext pixels
Obviously, depending on the particular permutation u, some of these four pixels might coincide.
Note that the plaintext pixel p b (1) is affected by only c 1 because c 0 is a fixed system parameter. Hence, for two rounds, p b (1) is affected by the ciphertext pixels
Example 1. We illustrate the causal relations in the decryption for two rounds. Here, n = 6 and permutation u is given as u = 1 2 3 4 5 6 2 4 1 5 6 3 .
The causality paths are given in Fig. 1 . In the figure, the directed arrows indicate which pixels affect the computation of the destination pixel. For example, The causality chain from the ciphertext d to the plaintext p is given as follows
Note that p 3 is affected by only c 1 because u(3) = 1. c 1 is, in turn, affected by two ciphertext pixels d 1 and d 2 . Also note that p 4 is affected by three ciphertext pixels rather than four because u(u(4) − 1) = u 2 (4) − 1 = 5. This also means that there are two distinct causality paths going from d 5 to p 4 .
Detecting causality using chosen ciphertext images
In general, for the decryption in an R round algorithm, a particular plaintext pixel p j is affected by at most 2 R ciphertext pixels. For a 256 × 256 image encrypted in ten rounds, we have n = 65 536 and 2 R = 1024. Hence, only about 1024/65 536 ≈ 2% of ciphertext pixels affect any given fixed plaintext pixel. Let us denote by z, the ciphertext image after R rounds of encryption. The attacker wishes to know if there is a causality path from the ciphertext pixel z i to the plaintext pixel p j . Assume that the attacker knows a plaintext-ciphertext image pair (p, z). He changes the value of z i and requests the plaintext for the changed ciphertext. If p j is changed in the new plaintext, then there is a causality path from z i to p j so that z i affects p j .
Note that, for some changes to z i , p j might remain the same even when there are causality paths from z i to p j . This is due to the nonlinearity of encryption/decryption that operates in a finite domain. In order to detect all the causality paths, the attacker needs to try more than one change to z i . It is highly unlikely that p j remains fixed for all of these changes. Thus, in order to construct the matrix T for n pixel images, the attacker needs to choose O(n) ciphertext images.
Detecting changes for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the attacker constructs a binary matrix T showing the causality relations between ciphertext and plaintext pixels in decryption. If T ij = 1, then it means that z i affects p j . Since p j is affected by at most 2 R pixels of z, each column of T contains at most 2 R 1's. All the other entries are zero. Hence, for one round, p b(1) is affected by only c 1 , the first pixel of the output of the first round. The remaining rounds generate at most 2 R−1 distinct causality paths. Therefore, column b(1) of T contains at most 2 R−1 1's. Thus, the column of the matrix T with the least number of 1's will provide the attacker a starting point for the attack. Once an attacker constructs the matrix T, he can reveal b(1) by choosing column k with the least column sum. Then he knows that b(1) = k or u(k) = 1.
For example, by inspecting the matrix T in Example 2, the attacker can see that the third column has the least sum. Thus, he concludes that u(3) = 1.
Tree of causality
In order to generalize the attack to the rest of u, we define an operation to denote the causality relations between the sets.
Given a permutation u on the set {1, 2, . . . n}, define the operation L on a set A as follows.
The set L(A) has natural meaning in terms of decryption. Using Eq. (5), we see that set L(A) is the set of ciphertext pixels that affect set A of plaintext pixels in one round of decryption. In particular, for an integer k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, L({k}) is given as
When L operates on a set with a single element k,
We can naturally compose L with itself to define its higher powers. Thus, for L 2 (k), we have
Here, we implicitly assumed that 1 / ∈ {u(k), u 2 (k), u(u(k) − 1)}. If we have u(k) = 1 and u 2 (k) = 1, then, by the definition of L, we have
Again, the powers of L has a natural interpretation in terms of multiround encryption. For an integer k, L i (k) is the set of indices of the ciphertext pixels that affect the plaintext p k in i round decryption. This set is also the set of row indices where the kth column of T has nonzero entries. 
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Overlapping sets of leaves
Using the chosen-ciphertext attack given at the beginning of this section, the attacker constructs the matrix T. This is the same as the attacker knowing the sets L R (k), ∀ k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. The attacker uses this knowledge to reveal the secret permutation u. First, we need the following fact.
Lemma 4. Let x, y and z be integers in {1, 2, . . . n} such that they satisfy
Then, for every positive integer R larger than 1,
Proof. By the definition of L, we have for every integer a in {1, 2, . . . n},
For the case a = y, we have u(y) = 1, and therefore
Similarly, for a = z,
Finally, for a = x,
Using Eqs. (12) and (14) together with the identity A \ B = A ∩ B, we obtain
Note that, we take the set that complements with respect to the universal set {1, 2, . . . , n}. Comparing Eq. (15) with Eq. (13), the result immediately follows. Figure 2 illustrates the overlap and the intersection of the sets L R (a) and L R−1 (a). Proof. Using Eq. (11) with a = x, we obtain
Lemma 5. Let x and y be integers such that u(x) = 1 and u(y)
. Using Eq. (11) once more with a = y, and applying the assumptions of the lemma, we obtain
The result immediately follows.
The attack
The attack starts with determining the integer x 1 that satisfies u(x 1 ) = 1. For this, the attacker chooses the set L R (x 1 ) that has the least number of elements. This also corresponds to choosing the column of the matrix T with the least column sum. There may be more than one candidate for x 1 . In such cases, the attacker repeats the rest of the procedure for each candidate until he encounters a contradiction that he can use to eliminate the candidate.
Once the attacker knows x 1 , he goes on to determine x 2 such that u(x 2 ) = 2. Define the set X 2 as
By Lemma 5, x 2 ∈ X 2 . In the likely case that X 2 contains a single element, the attacker uniquely pins down x 2 . If there are more than one candidate for x 2 , the attacker again repeats the rest of the procedure until he can eliminate candidates. Now, the attacker knows x 1 and x 2 such that u(x 1 ) = 1 and u(x 2 ) = 2. He then searches for x 3 such that u(x 3 ) = 3. In order to pin down x 3 , the attacker finds the set defined by
By Lemma 4, x 3 ∈ X 3 . If X 3 contains a single element, then the attacker has just found x 3 that satisfies u(x 3 ) = 3. The attacker continues in this fashion and uses his knowledge of x i and x i+1 to reveal x i+2 such that u(x i ) = i, u(x i+1 ) = i + 1 and u(x i+1 ) = i + 2. The attack concludes when all the entries of the secret permutation u are revealed.
In cases when X i+1 contains z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z v , the attacker applies the procedure for each z m , 1 ≤ m ≤ v, each time assuming that u(z m ) = i + 1.
For false candidates, we expect the iteration to yield an empty set at some point. Namely, if the set In Algorithm 1, Line 3, we find the candidates for b(i + 1). In doing so, we exclude the set {b(1), b(2), . . . , b(i)} which is assumed to have been revealed so far. For each candidate z, Lines 6-10 recursively apply the algorithm assuming that u(z) = i + 1. The function FindNext() returns in Line 13 when no candidates are found. It means that the recursion cannot go any deeper because a wrong assumption about the permutation value has been made. In this case, Line 11 backtracks once and another candidate is tried.
The space complexity of the attack depends on the memory required to store the matrix T. Assuming that we have a N × M image and R rounds, T is stored in N 2 M 2 bits. However, T is sparse when the attack is feasible. Therefore, the memory requirement drops down to O(2 R NM ) bits.
Simulations
We first illustrate the attack with an artificially small image size. We choose R = 3 and assume an image size of 4 × 4. Therefore, the secret permutation u maps within the set {1, 2, . . . 16}. We generated the permutation randomly and it is given as u = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 9 8 6 12 1 11 14 15 7 3 10 2 16 5 4 13 .
The other fixed functions g and h are chosen randomly. The attacker calculates the matrix T as 
For the ith column of the matrix T, the row indices of 1's give the set L 3 (i).
First, the attacker reveals b(1). For this, he finds the minimum sum column which is column 5. Thus, the attacker reveals that u(5) = 1, or equivalently that b(1) = 5. From the fifth column, the attacker sees that L 3 (5) = {6, 7, 14, 15}. He then uses Lemma 5 and searches for the column that has 1's in its sixth, seventh, 14th and 15th rows. This column turns out to be the 12th one. Hence, he concludes b(2) = 12. Now that the attacker knows the values of b(1) and b(2), next, he applies Algorithm 1. Using the matrix T, he calculates that L 3 (12)\L 3 (5) = {13}. Searching through the columns of T, the attacker finds that columns 1, 7, 10, 11, 16 have 1 in their 13th rows. Thus, Z = {1, 7, 10, 11, 16}. Now, he tries those as candidates for b(3). First, he assumes b(3) = 1. On this assumption, he calculates the set L 3 (1)\L 3 (12) = {3, 4, 5, 10, 11}. But, there is no column that has 1's in its rows corresponding to this set. Hence, b(3) = 1. Next, he tries b(3) = 7. He calculates L 3 (7)\L 3 (12) = {1, 3, 4, 11, 12}. Again, there is no column that has 1's in its rows corresponding to this set. The third candidate is 10, which happens to be the correct one. Assuming b(3) = 10, the attacker quickly reveals the rest of the secret permutation b.
We now give the results of the attack for an image size of 256 × 256.
We used R = 10 as suggested in [Fridrich, 1998 ]. We generated permutation u using the Baker's Map with the keys as K = [2 4 2 8 4 8 4]. The fixed functions g and h are again chosen randomly.
Simulations are performed under GNU gcc compiler running on Mac OS X 10.5.4 with Intel Core 2 Duo 2.16 GHz processor and 2 GB RAM. The whole map u is recovered successfully in less than 20 minutes. Moreover, the total memory requirement for the whole implementation was approximately 1 GB. In order to make the Algorithm 1 run more efficiently, we used a sparse matrix data structure for matrix T . Thus, we reduced the search time needed for constructing the set Z in Line 3 of the algorithm.
Conclusions
Since its proposal in 1998, Fridrich's chaotic image encryption has generally been considered secure. Indeed, many image encryption algorithms have taken it as a benchmark against which their efficiencies are measured.
In this paper, we have given a cryptanalysis of Fridrich's chaotic image cipher. We have demonstrated that rather than attacking the underlying secret keys, an attacker can instead reveal the secret permutation. In attacking the permutation, the attacker uses the overlaps among the sets of indices of ciphertext pixels that affect related plaintext pixels. We demonstrated the success of the attacks on an image of realistic size.
The chosen-ciphertext attack that we proposed can be applied to other encryption algorithms that have a structure similar to the one in [Fridrich, 1998] . Naturally, every encryption algorithm has a particular algebraic structure that has to be taken into account in its cryptanalysis. Here, for the sake of illustration, we briefly discuss a particular application of our proposed attack.
One of the well-known chaotic image encryption algorithms in the literature is that proposed in . Similar to [Fridrich, 1998 ], the algorithm consists of multiple rounds of permutation and diffusion. The permutation step is implemented using a 3D cat map. Similar to [Fridrich, 1998 ], the diffusion step mixes consecutive pixels of the permuted image using a chaotically modulated XOR function. Although a 3D chaotic map provides a better scattering of pixels compared to 2D maps, our attack is still applicable in this case because we do not make any assumptions on how the secret permutation b in Eq. (5) is obtained. Likewise, our attack does not depend on any assumptions on the nonlinear function g in Eq. (5). Hence, our attack can be launched without modification against the algorithm proposed in .
The success of our attack mainly depends on the small size of the set Z on Line 3 of Algorithm 1. For realistic image sizes and a 10-round encryption, Z contains only a single element in most cases. If the number of rounds R is increased, the sets L R (x) contain more and more elements. Assuming that the causality paths do not have overlaps, the set L R (x) contains 2 R elements. When R is increased to R = log 2 n, L R (x) contains n elements, i.e. L R (x) = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Thus, Z in Line 3 of the algorithm contains all the unrevealed elements. Therefore, the number of trials in Line 6 of the attack algorithm increases to n. This makes the present attack infeasible.
Although the increase of rounds appears to suggest an obvious defense against our attack, larger images would still present a problem because in that case the sets Z would become smaller making the attack feasible again. One solution might be to break the images into smaller fragments and encrypt each fragment using a fixed number of rounds. If each partition has n 0 pixels, in order to resist our attack, n 0 has to be smaller than 2 R .
Modifying the way the pixels are passed through the nonlinear function might also provide a defense against our attack. In the proposed scheme, for one round, a plaintext pixel is affected by at most two ciphertext pixels. This dependence can be increased by several methods. One particularly easy method would be to nonlinearly mix more than two pixels. Indeed, if m pixels of ciphertext affect one pixel of plaintext, then having R satisfy R > log m n would provide a dependence complicated enough to preclude the present attack.
Another possible defense is to modify the permutation function b in each round. This can be done using a key scheduling mechanism that generates R different permutations depending on the key.
Of course, each of these defenses require a rigorous analysis of the whole new algorithm for weaknesses and statistical properties.
